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1. Introduction
Scholarly	attention	to	informal	governance	in	international	politics	has	substantively	increased	in	recent	
years	(Westerwinter	and	Abbott	2016:	2).	Research	in	this	field	is	spurred	by	the	observation	of	a	rise	in	
the	number	of	informal	intergovernmental	organizations	(IIGOs)	and	transnational	governance	initiatives	
(TGIs),	both	of	which	that	take	over	part	of	the	roles	traditionally	handled	by	formal	intergovernmental	
organizations	 (FIGOs).	 While	 IIGOs	 are	 composed	 of	 national	 governments	 and	 thus	 resemble	 FIGOs	
except	 for	 their	 informal	organizational	 structure,	 TGIs	 include	a	 variety	of	different	members	 ranging	
from	 private	 firms,	 over	 non-governmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 to	 governments	 at	 various	 levels.2	
Moreover,	 within	 FIGOs,	 formal	 governance	 structures	 have	 been	 increasingly	 challenged	 by	 new	
emerging	powers,	and	researchers	have	become	interested	in	assessing	to	what	extent	formal	processes	
are	simply	circumvented	by	informal	processes	to	(re)establish	the	balance	of	control	corresponding	to	
actual	power	relations	between	countries	(e.g.,	Stone	2011).	Overall,	a	host	of	recent	studies	documents	
the	 substantial	 rise	 of	 informality	 in	 world	 politics	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 of	 existing	 formal	
organizations.		
However,	 the	 development	 of	 informality	 differs	 between	 different	 issue	 areas,	 and	 only	 limited	
information	is	available	so	far	on	the	explanation	of	different	roles	that	informality	takes	in	these	fields.	
This	paper	contributes	to	this	knowledge	as	one	out	of	three	comparable	case	studies	assessing	similar	
questions	within	the	sphere	of	different	regime	complexes.		
The	 specific	 issue	 area	 considered	here	 is	 international	 climate	policy.	 The	United	Nations	 Framework	
Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (UNFCCC)	 provides	 the	 formal	 organizational	 structure	 specifically	
created	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 dealing	with	 the	 challenge	 of	 global	 climate	 change.	 The	UNFCCC	 being	 a	
United	Nations	organization,	all	members	have	equal	 formal	 rights	so	 that	 issues	of	 struggle	 regarding	
the	 readjustment	 of	 the	 formal	 power	 balance	 within	 the	 organization	 do	 not	 arise.	 In	 recent	 years,	
notably	before	the	Paris	Agreement	of	December	2015,	the	UNFCCC	has	widely	been	regarded	as	unable	
to	 fulfill	 its	 role	 to	provide	a	universally	accepted	 international	 regime	 for	mitigation	of	global	 climate	
change,	giving	rise	to	a	search	for	alternative	or	complementary	solutions.	Climate	change	is	also	an	area	
that	has	spurred	considerable	public	 interest	and	media	attention,	which	may	quite	naturally	 lead	to	a	
strong	involvement	of	private	actors	and	their	engagement	within	TGIs.	For	most	countries,	international	
climate	policy	is	an	area	of	low	politics,	strongly	related	to	questions	of	social	justice	and	redistribution.	
Nevertheless,	due	 to	 the	 threats	of	 climate	change	 for	 survival	of	 small	 island	states	and	conflicts	e.g.	
generated	 through	 migration	 pressure	 within	 and	 between	 countries,	 links	 to	 high	 politics	 such	 as	
security	 policy	 also	 exist.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 case	 of	 international	 climate	 policy	 may	 be	
1	Financial	support	by	the	Swiss	Network	for	International	Studies	(SNIS)	is	gratefully	acknowledged.	
2	For	a	detailed	definition	of	the	different	types	of	organizations,	see	Westerwinter	and	Abbott	(2016:	1).	
2considered	as	 situated	somewhere	 in	between	 the	other	 two	cases	considered	 in	 this	volume,	namely	
the	case	of	development	finance	(Reinsberg	2016)	and	the	case	of	security	policy	(Westerwinter	2016).	
In	the	following,	we	will	describe	and	explain	the	development	of	informality	within	the	climate	change	
regime	complex,	and	discuss	 its	effect	on	the	overarching	goal	of	mitigating	global	climate	change.	We	
will	 first	 consider	 informality	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 actors	 within	 the	 regime	 complex	 (Section	 2),	 and	
second,	 informality	 of	 rules	 and	processes	within	 the	 formal	 structure	of	 the	UNFCCC	 (Section	3).	 The	
analysis	 is	 based	 on	 a	 review	 of	 the	 existing	 literature,	 participant	 observation	 at	 the	 UNFCCC’s	
Conferences	of	 the	parties	 (COP)	 since	1995,	 and	 specific	 stakeholder	 interviews	at	COP	21	 in	Paris	 in	
20153.	Regarding	the	relevant	actors,	 it	also	draws	upon	the	database	provided	by	Westerwinter	et	al.	
(2015)	on	the	basis	of	prior	work	by	Pevehouse	et	al.	(2015),	Vabulas	and	Snidal	(2013),	Abbott	and	Hale	
(2014),	Roger	et	al.	(2016),	and	Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	(2016b),	partially	updated	for	the	specific	
context	of	this	case	study	through	our	stakeholder	interviews	and	information	on	observer	organizations	
available	on	the	UNFCCC	website	(see	http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/igo.pl?mode=wim).		
Overall,	our	study	suggests	that	while	there	has	been	a	significant	rise	of	informal	organizations	involved	
in	international	climate	politics,	they	generally	do	not	play	an	independent	role	with	respect	to	the	core	
objective	of	the	climate	change	regime	to	mitigate	climate	change,	but	rather	support	the	UNFCCC	in	its	
attempt	 to	 respond	 to	 this	 challenge.	Within	 the	UNFCCC,	 a	 variety	 of	 informal	 rules	 and	 procedures	
have	developed	over	 time,	but	 some	of	 them	were	also	been	challenged	 for	 lack	of	 transparency	and	
equity,	 were	 abandoned	 at	 some	 point,	 and	 have	 now	 been	 replaced	 by	 more	 formal	 or	 alternative	
informal	 procedures.	 While	 some	 informal	 procedures	 were	 clearly	 instrumental	 to	 successful	
agreements,	 others	 are	 widely	 blamed	 for	 having	 contributed	 to	 their	 failure.	 Hence	 the	 appropriate	
choice	 of	 informal	 procedures	 appears	 to	 be	 crucial	 for	 the	 success	 or	 the	 lack	 thereof	 within	 the	
UNFCCC.	 This	 provides	 a	 strong	 role	 and	 responsibility	 for	 the	 host	 country	 government	 of	 each	 COP	
since	 it	 is	 charged	 with	 the	 presidency	 and	 hence	 responsible	 for	 a	 smooth	 organization	 of	 the	
negotiation	process	at	the	COP.	
2. The	rise	of	informal	organizations	and	initiatives
Our	discussion	of	 the	 relevant	actors	builds	on	prior	work	notably	by	Keohane	and	Victor	 (2011),	who	
introduce	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 regime	 complex	 into	 climate	 policy,	 and	 provide	 a	 differentiated	
assessment	of	the	roles	and	objectives	of	different	organizations	created	and	active	within	this	context.	
Michonski	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 also	provide	 a	 detailed	discussion	of	 selected	 formal	 and	 informal	multilateral	
organizations	 involved	in	the	field.	Green	(2013)	takes	these	ideas	forward	with	a	specific	focus	on	the	
role	of	private	actors.	This	perspective	also	plays	an	important	role	in	the	subsequent	literature	focusing	
on	TGIs.	Bulkeley	et	al.	(2014)	as	well	as	Andonova	and	Hale	(2016)	provide	a	comprehensive	overview	of	
the	 differentiated	 structure	 of	 these	 initiatives,	 and	 combine	 the	 contributions	 of	 a	 large	 number	 of	
scholars	to	explain	the	emergence,	and	to	assess	the	role	of	TGIs	for	climate	change	governance.		
We	start	our	discussion	with	an	updated	overview	of	the	development	of	the	different	organizations	and	
initiatives	over	time.	This	will	be	followed	by	an	attempt	to	explain	this	development	and	to	summarize	
3	For	a	list	of	interviews,	see	Annex	1.	
3its	 effects	 based	 on	 existing	 studies	 and	 our	 additional	 information	 from	 interviews	 and	 participant	
observation	at	the	COPs.		
2.1.	Development	over	time	
International	 climate	 policy	 emerged	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 and	 was	 institutionalized	 in	 the	 early	 1990s.	
Initially,	 the	 international	 process	 on	 climate	 change	 was	 driven	 by	 single	 governments	 organizing	
conferences	 on	 this	 issue,	 such	 as	 the	 Toronto	 conference	 in	 1988	 in	 Canada,	 and	 the	 Nordwijk	
conference	 1989	 in	 the	 Netherlands.	 The	 first	 FIGO	 built	 around	 climate	 change	 issues	 was	 the	
Intergovernmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (IPCC)	 set	 up	 in	 1988.	 Its	 reports,	 especially	 the	 First	
Assessment	Report	of	1990,	became	crucial	in	development	of	international	climate	change	governance	
(Johnson	 2014).	 In	 a	 relatively	 short	 negotiation	 process	 spanning	 1991	 and	 1992,	 the	 UNFCCC	 was	
agreed	upon.	Since	the	UNFCCC’s	entry	into	force	in	1994	its	Secretariat	organized	a	formal	negotiation	
process	meeting	at	least	twice	a	year.	
Formal	 intergovernmental	organizations	 like	multilateral	development	banks	have	actively	participated	
in	UNFCCC	negotiations	 from	the	beginning.	The	World	Bank	especially	played	a	very	proactive	 role	 in	
developing	 pilot	 approaches	 for	 the	market	mechanisms	 under	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 as	well	 as	 climate	
finance	 after	 the	 Copenhagen	 Accord.	 The	 OECD	 regularly	 published	 analyses	 aiming	 to	 “educate”	
negotiators	 regarding	 the	 rational	 design	 of	 key	 instruments	 of	 the	 regime.	 The	 same	 applies	 for	 the	
International	 Energy	 Agency	 (IEA).	 Both	 institutions	 publish	 data	 on	 CO2	 emissions	 from	 fossil	 fuel	
consumption	annually,	thus	providing	a	means	to	compare	country	performance	with	regards	to	climate	
change	mitigation.		
With	the	climate	negotiations	gaining	in	importance,	further	FIGOs	became	associated	with	the	process,	
mostly	as	implementers	or	facilitators	of	climate-related	projects	in	their	specific	area	of	activity.	Within	
the	UN	system	it	became	impossible	for	FIGOs	in	related	areas	to	ignore	the	UNFCCC	process	(interviews	
with	representatives	of	UN	organizations	present	at	COP	21).	In	contrast	to	the	large	scale	involvement	
of	 existing	 organizations,	 only	 few	 FIGOs	 were	 newly	 created	 with	 a	 specific	 focus	 on	 international	
climate	policy.	Notable	exceptions	are	the	Global	Environment	Facility	(GEF)	and	the	Green	Climate	Fund	
(GCF)	that	were	established	as	financial	mechanisms	of	the	UNFCCC	in	1991	and	2010	respectively.		
The	 significant	 rise	 of	 formal	 intergovernmental	 organizations	 involved	 in	 the	 climate	 change	 regime	
complex	was	paralleled	by	a	similar	rise	of	 informal	 intergovernmental	organizations	and	transnational	
governance	initiatives	(see	Figure	1).	In	terms	of	sheer	numbers,	notably	the	recent	rise	of	the	number	of	
TGIs	 is	 impressive.	 With	 an	 overall	 number	 of	 more	 than	 a	 hundred	 in	 2015,	 they	 come	 close	 to	
outnumbering	the	formal	intergovernmental	organizations	active	in	the	field.	In	contrast,	the	number	of	
IIGOs	has	been	growing	more	slowly,	but	also	more	steadily.	This	is	in	line	with	the	overall	development	
across	issue	areas	(see	Westerwinter	and	Abbott	2016:	Figure	3).	Figure	2	illustrates	that	TGIs	and	IIGOs	
together	now	represent	more	than	half	of	the	organizations	within	the	climate	change	regime	complex.	
Of	course,	this	kind	of	presentation	does	not	take	into	account	the	size	and	the	relevance	of	the	different	
organizations,	which	will	be	further	discussed	below.		
4Figure	1:	The	involvement	of	FIGOs,	IIGOs	and	TGIs	in	a	comparative	perspective	
Figure	2:	The	relative	shares	of	FIGOs,	IIGOs	and	TGIs	
As	opposed	 to	 FIGOs	most	 of	which	 simply	 started	 to	 orient	 some	of	 their	 activities	 towards	 climate-
relevant	 topics,	 the	overwhelming	majority	of	non-formal	organizations	and	 initiatives	 in	our	database	
are	new	organizations,	created	specifically	 for	 the	purpose	of	activities	related	to	 international	climate	
policy.	How	did	the	growth	process	of	IIGOs	and	TGIs	develop	over	time	and	what	kind	of	organizations	
are	involved?	
5Just	as	FIGOs,	IIGOs	have	been	an	important	feature	of	international	climate	negotiations	right	from	the	
beginning.	The	vast	majority	of	 these	 informal	organizations	are	 the	country	negotiation	groups	active	
within	 the	 framework	of	 the	UNFCCC.	 The	 frontrunner	was	 the	Alliance	of	 Small	 Island	 States	 (AOSIS)	
that	 already	 emerged	 in	 1990	 before	 the	 Intergovernmental	 Negotiating	 Committee	 (INC)	 started	 its	
deliberations.	In	the	period	leading	up	to	the	agreement	on	the	Kyoto	Protocol	to	the	UNFCCC	in	1997,	
the	landscape	of	negotiation	groups	was	comparatively	simple.	Market-oriented	industrialized	countries	
that	 were	 somewhat	 reluctant	 to	 address	 climate	 change	 formed	 a	 group	 called	 “JUSSCANZ”	 (the	
acronym	being	derived	from	the	initials	of	the	original	members	Japan,	US,	Switzerland,	Canada	and	New	
Zealand)	 while	 developing	 countries	 negotiated	 through	 the	 G77+China,	 with	 vocal	 subsidiary	 groups	
being	 AOSIS	 and	 the	 Organisation	 of	 the	 Petroleum	 Exporting	 Countries	 (OPEC)	 (Lesolle	 2014).	 After	
Russia	 joined	 JUSSCANZ	 in	 1997,	 the	 group	was	 relabeled	 as	 “Umbrella	Group”.	 Among	 these	 groups,	
only	 JUSSCANZ	 and	 AOSIS	 had	 an	 informal	 character,	 since	 both	 OPEC	 and	 G77+China	 had	 been	
established	with	a	formal	governance	structure	and	administrative	offices	long	before.		
The	 rise	 of	 informal	 negotiation	 groups	 started	 in	 the	 year	 2000,	 which	 saw	 the	 formation	 of	 the	
Environmental	Integrity	Group	(EIG),	consisting	of	Switzerland,	Liechtenstein,	Monaco,	Mexico	and	South	
Korea.	 Until	 today,	 it	 remains	 the	 only	 group	 including	 both	 industrialized	 and	 developing	 countries	
(Darby	2015).	 In	the	following	years,	mainly	triggered	by	the	failure	of	 the	conference	 in	The	Hague	 in	
late	 2000,	 regional	 groups	 started	 to	 emerge,	 such	 as	 the	 African	 Group,	 the	 Grupo	 de	 Iniciativa	
Latinoamericana	(GRILA),	Countries	of	Central	Asia	and	the	Caucasus,	Albania	and	Moldova	(CACAM)	and	
Central	 Group	 11	 (CG	 11)	 for	 Eastern	 European	 countries	 (see	 Royden	 2001	 and	 UNFCCC	 2016b).	
However,	some	of	these	regional	groups	were	rather	 instable	and	only	a	few	have	survived	to	date,	as	
regional	allegiances	have	been	substituted	by	content-related	ones	(see	e.g.	Costantini	et	al.	2016:	136).	
The	 first	of	 those	was	 the	Coalition	 for	Rainforest	Nations	 (CfRN)	 formed	 in	2005	which	 is	 fighting	 for	
incentives	 to	 prevent	 emissions	 from	 forest	 destruction	 (CfRN	 2016).	 This	 group	 has	 even	 set	 up	 a	
Secretariat,	thus	becoming	an	FIGO.		
The	 Copenhagen	 Conference	 of	 2009	 and	 its	 aftermath	 led	 to	 an	 open	 split	 of	 G77+China	 in	 various	
groups	that	often	overlap.	 In	the	run-up	to	the	conference	the	 large	emerging	economies	Brazil,	South	
Africa,	India	and	China	formed	the	BASIC	group.	After	the	failure	of	Copenhagen,	the	socialist	countries	
from	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	 Caribbean	 set	 up	 the	 Bolivarian	 Alliance	 for	 the	 Peoples	 of	 Our	 America	
(ALBA).	The	year	2012	saw	the	birth	of	the	progressive	group	“Independent	Alliance	of	Latin	America	and	
the	Caribbean”	(AILAC)	which	then	triggered	the	“Like-Minded	Developing	Countries	on	Climate	Change”	
(LMDC)	 bringing	 together	 developing	 countries	 from	 all	 continents	 reluctant	 to	 engage	 in	 strong	
mitigation	policy.	Since	Copenhagen,	 the	Least	Developed	Countries	have	 formed	a	negotiation	group,	
too.	 The	 Paris	 Conference	 saw	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 “High	 Ambition	 Coalition”	 including	 over	 100	
countries	and	unlikely	to	 last	due	to	the	vast	variation	of	preferences	among	its	members.	Overall,	the	
landscape	of	 country	 negotiation	 groups	 has	moved	 from	 few,	mutually	 exclusive	 groups	with	 a	 large	
membership	to	a	plethora	of	groups	with	overlapping	membership	(see	Figure	3).	For	further	details	on	
the	 individual	 groups,	 see	 Blaxekjaer	 and	 Nielsen	 (2015)	 and	 Government	 of	 France	 (2015).	
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Figure	3:	The	development	of	negotiation	groups	over	time	
																																					until	1997
	
																																						1997-2000
	
																																					2000-2005	
	
	
																																				2005-2009	
	
																																				2009-2012	
	
																																					2012-2016	
	
Notes:	The	acronyms	refer	to:	G77+China	-	Group	of	77	+	China;	AOSIS	-	Alliance	of	Small	Island	States;	OPEC	-	Organisation	of	the	Petroleum	Exporting	
Countries;	EU	-	European	Union;	GRILA	-	Grupo	de	Iniciativa	Latinoamericana;	CACAM	-	Countries	of	Central	Asia	and	the	Caucasus,	Albania	and	Moldova;	EIG	-	
Environmental	Integrity	Group;	CG-11	-	Central	Group	11;	CfRN	-	Coalition	for	Rainforest	Nations;	CVF	-	Climate	Vulnerable	Forum;	LMDC	-	Like	Minded	
Developing	Countries;	BASIC	-	Brazil,	South	Africa,	India	and	China;	LDCs	-	Least	Developed	Countries.	New	groups	are	highlighted	by	red	circles.	For	the	list	of	
members	in	each	of	these	groups,	see:	https://www.carbonbrief.org/interactive-the-negotiating-alliances-at-the-paris-climate-conference.		
Annex	1	refers	to	the	corresponding	annex	of	the	Convention,	which	lists	all	countries	that	were	members	of	the	OECD	in	1992;	the	Russian	Federation	and	the	
countries	with	economies	in	transitions	including	those	from	Central	to	Eastern	Europe.	Non	Annex	1	refers	to	all	other	UNFCCC	member	countries.		
	
	
7	
Apart	from	country	negotiation	groups	only	a	handful	of	other	informal	intergovernmental	organizations	are	
part	 of	 the	 climate	 change	 regime	 complex.	 These	 include	 the	 Group	 of	 Eight	 (G8),	 G8+5	 (i.e.,	 G8	 in	
combination	with	Brazil,	China,	India,	Mexico	and	South	Africa),	the	Group	of	Twenty	(G20),	and	the	Major	
Economies	 Forum	 (Michonski	 et	 al.	 2010:	 8ff.,	 Keohane	 and	 Victor	 2011:	 10f).	 The	 G8	 started	 to	 debate	
climate	related	topics	in	2005,	but	these	discussions	were	broadened	to	include	other	major	emitters	at	the	
level	of	the	G8+5	and	the	G20	or	the	Major	Economies	Forum	in	later	years.	The	Major	Economies	Forum	is	
almost	identical	to	G20	in	its	membership,	but	confined	to	the	discussion	of	climate	policy	(Michonski	et	al.	
2010:	10).	
As	opposed	to	IIGOs,	TGIs	have	emerged	primarily	after	the	Kyoto	Protocol	was	agreed	in	1997.	We	further	
observe	 an	 irregular	 growth	 trend.	 There	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 steepening	 of	 the	 increase	 with	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol’s	entry	into	force	in	2005,	and	a	flattening	after	the	Copenhagen	conference	in	2009	followed	by	a	
further	upward	jump	shortly	before	the	conference	in	Paris	in	2015.	These	shifts	concern	different	types	of	
TGIs:	 The	 TGIs	 created	 just	 after	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 like	 the	 Prototype	 Carbon	 Fund	 and	 various	 similar	
carbon	 funds	 managed	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 focus	 on	 the	 market	 mechanisms	 defined	 under	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol,	 the	 Clean	 Development	Mechanism	 (CDM)	 and	 Joint	 Implementation	 (JI).	 These	 TGIs	 include	 a	
variety	of	government	and	non-government	actors.	Their	members	provide	the	funding	for	concrete	climate	
change	mitigation	projects	generating	emission	credits	under	the	CDM	and	JI	proposed	by	the	manager	of	
the	fund.		
When	the	Kyoto	Protocol	entered	into	force,	and	signaled	that	in	industrialized	member	countries	significant	
emission	reductions	would	truly	become	necessary	and	thus	emission	credits	would	have	a	significant	value,	
a	number	of	networks	and	standards	for	participation	in	the	Kyoto	Mechanisms	were	initiated,	frequently	by	
private	actors	and	sub-national	level	governments.	The	Copenhagen	failure	in	late	2009	to	reach	consensus	
on	a	successor	agreement	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol	triggered	a	collapse	in	the	demand	for	emission	credits	for	
the	 time	 after	 2012	 and	 thus	 significantly	 reduced	 the	 development	 of	 this	 type	 of	 TGIs.	 The	 final	major	
increase	 of	 TGIs	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 Paris	 Conference	 in	 2015	 is	mostly	 due	 to	 new	networks	with	 little	
emphasis	 on	 concrete	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 measures,	 primarily	 signaling	 the	 participating	 actors’	
willingness	to	avoid	a	total	standstill	of	the	international	negotiation	process	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	
2016b).	 Overall,	 among	 the	 109	 climate-related	 TGIs	 in	 our	 dataset	 the	 majority	 of	 68%	 focuses	 on	
networking,	20%	are	standards,	8%	are	carbon	funds,	4%	relate	to	technology	development,	and	5%	have	no	
mitigation	related	purpose,	but	purely	focus	on	adaptation	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2016b).	
While	 the	 increase	 in	 TGI	numbers	 is	 impressive,	 the	above	categorization	may	already	 suggest	 that	 their	
relevance	for	actual	international	climate	policy	varies	considerably.	When	examining	organizational	design	
features	ensuring	that	TGI	members	effectively	take	action	for	emissions	reductions,	we	see	that,	in	fact,	the	
bulk	 of	 initiatives	 cannot	 be	 expected	 to	 induce	 significant	 climate	 change	 mitigation:	 Only	 11%	 of	 the	
initiatives	 formulate	 any	 mitigation	 target,	 and	 only	 13%	 provide	 some	 kind	 of	 financial	 incentives	 for	
mitigation	activities	of	their	members.	46%	of	the	initiatives	foresee	some	kind	of	monitoring,	reporting	and	
verification	(MRV),	but	only	27%	define	a	baseline	against	which	to	measure	potential	change.	Almost	half	of	
the	 initiatives	do	not	 show	any	of	 these	provisions	 (see	Annex	2,	Table	A1,	 last	 row,	and	Michaelowa	and	
Michaelowa	2016b,	Appendix	Table	A1).	
Actors	 participating	 in	 TGIs	 are	 mainly	 from	 industrialized	 countries.	 According	 to	 our	 data	 not	 even	 a	
quarter	of	the	initiatives	have	a	majority	of	members	from	developing	countries.	Furthermore,	while	only	a	
single	initiative	(the	“Asian	Cities	Climate	Change	Resilience	Network”	focusing	on	adaptation)	is	composed	
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of	 developing	 country	 actors	 alone,	 almost	 40%	 have	 members	 only	 from	 industrialized	 countries.	 In	
addition,	only	in	three	out	of	109	cases,	the	founding	country	(i.e.	the	home	country	of	the	founding	actor	or	
the	country	in	which	the	foundation	took	place)	is	not	an	OECD	country.	These	are	the	“Clean	Air	Initiative”	
founded	 in	 the	 Philippines	 in	 2001,	 “Socialcarbon”	 founded	 in	 Brazil	 in	 2008,	 and	 the	 “Panda	 Standard”	
founded	 in	China	 in	2009.	All	of	them	focus	on	MRV,	the	Chinese	one	additionally	requires	a	baseline,	but	
none	 of	 them	 have	 mitigation	 targets	 or	 incentives	 provided	 by	 the	 initiative.	 No	 significant	 mitigation-
related	initiative	has	been	created	by	or	dominated	by	vulnerable	low-income	countries.	TGIs	do	not	seem	to	
provide	an	appropriate	vehicle	for	them	to	promote	their	interests	and	to	overcome	their	limited	power	in	
the	formal	negotiation	process.	These	results	confirm	the	prior	analysis	of	transnational	climate	governance	
initiatives	 in	 Bulkeley	 et	 al.	 (2012).	 They	 are	 further	 reinforced	 by	 the	 finding	 that	 there	 is	 no	 positive	
correlation	(in	fact,	no	significant	correlation	at	all)	between	the	share	of	developing	country	actors	and	the	
presence	 of	 the	 different	 mitigation-related	 features	 of	 organizational	 design	 in	 these	 initiatives	 (see	
Annex	2,	Table	A1).	
	
2.2.	Explaining	the	rise	of	informal	organizations	and	initiatives	
Taking	together	the	timing	of	the	emergence	of	IIGOs	and	TGIs	and	their	purpose	discussed	above	suggests	
that	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	UNFCCC	process	 itself	 has	 been	driving	 the	 development	 of	 these	 organizations	
over	 time.	 This	 is	 most	 obvious	 for	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 IIGOs	 established	 as	 negotiation	 groups	 when	
countries	 noticed	 that	 given	 the	 development	 of	 the	 negotiations,	 coalitions	 with	 new	 partners	 would	
further	 their	 interests.	While	external	 to	 the	negotiations,	 TGIs	have	also	been	 responsive	 to	 the	UNFCCC	
process.	 The	 different	 typologies	 discussed	 above	 reflect	 their	 different	 purposes,	 namely	 sharing	
information	(networks),	developing	and	implementing	cost-effective	means	to	deal	with	upcoming	or	newly	
introduced	requirements	(carbon	funds,	technology	development	initiatives),	lobbying	in	order	to	influence	
the	 negotiation	 outcomes	 (networks),	 improving	 the	 members’	 public	 image	 and	 enhancing	 their	
competitiveness	through	transparency	about	their	mitigation	action	(networks,	standards).	They	all	relate	in	
some	way	or	the	other	to	the	UNFCCC	process	and	their	prevalence	among	newly	created	initiatives	directly	
corresponds	 to	 the	 signals	 provided	 there.	 Thus	 TGIs	 with	 a	 clear	 focus	 on	 concrete	 mitigation	 action	
emerged	primarily	 in	 the	context	of	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	 (see	also	 the	econometric	analysis	by	Michaelowa	
and	Michaelowa	2016b:	Table	3),	initially	mainly	driven	by	the	interest	of	the	private	sector	to	influence	the	
design	of	critical	policy	instruments,	and	later,	to	find	efficient	means	to	deal	with	the	Kyoto	emission	targets	
that	would	not	hamper	international	competitiveness.	Such	proactive	interest	from	the	private	sector	waned	
after	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	 conference	 in	 2009	 that	 signaled	 that	 no	 stringent	 emission	 targets	
would	be	taken	up	by	governments	in	the	foreseeable	future.	Since	then,	however,	some	governments	have	
become	interested	to	engage	the	private	sector	and	NGOs	in	climate	change	mitigation,	given	that	no	legally	
binding	framework	for	government-led	mitigation	existed	after	2012.	In	the	run-up	to	the	Paris	Conference	
in	2015,	the	UN	Secretary	General	himself	engaged	in	this	process	to	garner	support	for	international	climate	
policy	by	calling	a	summit	inviting	“world	leaders,	from	government,	finance,	business,	and	civil	society	[…]	
to	 galvanize	 and	 catalyze	 climate	 action.	 He	 has	 asked	 these	 leaders	 to	 bring	 bold	 announcements	 and	
actions	to	the	Summit	that	will	reduce	emissions”	(United	Nations	2014).	His	intervention	was	a	key	feature	
of	this	phase	and	triggered	the	strong	increase	in	TGIs	in	2014.	
These	observations	 correspond	 to	 the	analysis	by	Green	 (2013:2)	who	presents	 the	UNFCCC	as	 the	 “coral	
reef”	of	the	climate	change	regime	complex.	The	coral	reef	provides	the	backbone	of	the	whole	ecosystem	
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and	whatever	develops	in	this	system	depends	on	the	reef.	Similarly,	Keohane	and	Victor	(2011)	speak	about	
concentric	rings.	In	the	light	of	the	above	discussion,	we	would	slightly	adjust	and	update	their	presentation	
by	placing	the	UNFCCC	and	as	well	as	 IIGOs	 in	 form	of	negotiation	groups	at	 the	core,	a	number	of	highly	
influential	FIGOs	like	the	World	Bank	and	negotiation	fora	like	G8,	G20	and	the	MEF	as	well	as	the	few	new	
FIGOs	created	within	 the	negotiation	process	 (GEF	and	GCF)	 in	 the	second	ring,	and	other	FIGOs	 trying	 to	
influence	 the	 negotiations	 and/or	 to	 understand	which	 part	 of	 the	 agreement	 could	 be	 relevant	 for	 their	
own	mandate	along	with	TGIs	in	a	third	ring.	This	third	and	most	peripheral	ring	had	the	greatest	part	in	the	
strong	 rise	 of	 the	 number	 of	 organizations	 within	 the	 regime	 complex.	 Environmental	 NGOs,	 business	
lobbies	 and	 research	 institutions	 participating	 as	 accredited	 observers	 in	 the	 negotiation	 process	 can	 be	
considered	as	participants	at	the	same	level.		
	
2.3.	Effects	of	the	rise	of	informal	organizations	and	initiatives		
Negotiation	 groups	 are	 directly	 involved	 in	 rulemaking	 and	 thus	 highly	 influential	 within	 the	 UNFCCC	
process.	 Some	 groups	 have	 been	 particularly	 successful	 in	 this	 respect.	 AOSIS	 for	 instance,	 managed	 to	
bundle	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 vulnerable	 small	 island	 states	 at	 an	 early	 point	 in	 time	 and	 to	 jointly	
demonstrate	the	dramatic	consequences	of	climate	change.	Given	the	salience	the	issue	had	for	them,	they	
were	granted	a	seat	 in	certain	UNFCCC	committees,	 in	which	given	their	size	and	hard	power,	 they	would	
usually	not	have	been	permitted	to	send	a	delegate	(Benwell	2016:	70,	Betzold	et	al.	2012:	594).	At	the	other	
end	of	 the	developing	country	 spectrum,	BASIC	was	also	quite	 successful.	The	common	 interests	of	BASIC	
member	 countries	 were	 to	 avoid	 the	 introduction	 of	 commitments	 for	 emerging	 economies	 and	 to	 gain	
visibility	and	reputation	in	the	international	arena.	Indeed	the	Paris	Agreement	now	is	based	on	a	bottom-up	
system	in	which	each	country	can	itself	define	what	it	will	contribute	to	global	mitigation	efforts	and	can	also	
condition	any	activity	on	funding	by	industrialized	countries.	In	terms	of	international	reputation,	the	BASIC	
countries,	 notably	 India	 and	 China	 were	 often	 presented	 as	 spoilers	 of	 the	 negotiation	 process	 (see	 e.g.	
Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2012	 for	 India,	 Conrad	2012	 for	China),	but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 started	 to	be	
involved	in	all	high-level	discussions	(see	also	Section	3	below)	and	to	be	named	along	with	major	powers,	
notably	the	United	States.	It	is	no	doubt	not	coincidental	that	the	US	and	China	also	jointly	signed	the	Paris	
Agreement	at	the	G20	meeting	on	2nd	September	2016.		
Whether	 the	rise	of	negotiation	groups	and	their	substantial	 influence	on	the	negotiations	 is	advancing	or	
hindering	 a	 global	 effort	 towards	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 obviously	 depends	 on	 the	 balance	 between	
opposing	 groups	 within	 the	 process.	 It	 could	 be	 argued,	 however,	 that	 the	 break-up	 of	 G77+China	 into	
various	sub-groups	may	have	helped	to	unblock	the	stalemate	regarding	the	interpretation	of	the	UNFCCC’s	
‘common,	but	differentiated	responsibilities’	principle	and	supported	the	move	from	a	rigid	list	of	countries	
with	and	without	commitments	to	the	more	dynamic	approach	embodied	in	the	Paris	Agreement	in	which	
each	 country	 participates	 in	 away	 consistent	 with	 its	 (self-perceived)	 capacities	 (see	 Michaelowa	 and	
Michaelowa	2015).	The	eventual	climate	change	mitigation	achieved	by	this	approach	will	depend	on	how	
countries’	 ambitions	 evolve	 over	 time.	 The	 current	 engagements	 presented	 in	 the	 form	 of	 each	 party’s	
‘Nationally	 determined	 contribution’)	 leave	 a	 substantial	 gap	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 simultaneously	 agreed	
objective	to	keep	global	temperature	rise	“well	below	2°C”	(UNFCCC	2015).		
As	opposed	to	IIGOs,	to	date,	only	few	TGIs	have	been	able	to	directly	influence	rulemaking	at	the	UNFCCC.	
This	 has	 only	 been	 the	 case	 when	 TGIs	 combined	 highly	 reputed	 think	 tanks	 with	 governments	 and	 key	
private	 companies.	 For	 example,	 in	 such	 a	 strong	 coalition	 the	 US-based	 think	 tank	 “World	 Resources	
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Institute”	was	able	to	influence	accounting	rules	through	the	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol	initiative.	Apart	from	
such	 exceptional	 cases,	 TGIs	 have	 had	 some	 indirect	 effects	 through	 standard	 setting,	 lobbying,	 and	
influencing	 public	 opinion	 in	 the	members’	 countries	 of	 origin.	 Just	 as	 for	 the	 IIGOs	 discussed	 above,	 the	
effect	 on	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 is	 not	 unambiguously	 positive,	 but	 depends	 on	 the	 balance	 of	
preferences	among	TGI	members.	Given	the	limited	orientation	towards	mitigation	in	their	own	design,	high	
expectations	about	their	contribution	to	closing	the	Paris	Agreement’s	ambitions	gap	are	certainly	not	very	
realistic	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2016b).	Yet,	as	discussed	above,	some	TGIs	such	as	carbon	funds	have	
been	 very	 successful	 at	 supporting	 the	 implementation	of	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	 and	 could	 become	 similarly	
relevant	for	the	implementation	of	the	Paris	Agreement.		
Overall,	 our	 main	 conclusion	 is	 that	 the	 informal	 organizations	 and	 initiatives	 involved	 in	 international	
climate	politics	generally	did	not	play	an	independent	role	with	respect	to	the	core	objective	of	the	climate	
change	 regime	 to	 mitigate	 climate	 change,	 but	 rather	 worked	 either	 in	 response	 to	 outcomes	 from	 the	
UNFCCC	 or	 tried	 to	 influence	 these	 outcomes	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Despite	 the	 substantial	 increase	 in	 the	
number	of	organizations	and	initiatives	populating	the	climate	change	regime	complex,	the	UNFCCC	clearly	
remains	 at	 its	 core,	 and	 further	 developments	 of	 international	 climate	 policy	 will	 continue	 to	 depend	
crucially	on	the	success	of	this	international	regime.		
	
3.	Informality	of	rules	and	procedures	within	the	UNFCCC	
Given	 the	 central	 role	of	 the	UNFCCC,	we	will	 now	examine	how	 informality	has	 affected	 the	negotiation	
outcomes	 within	 this	 international	 regime.	 In	 this	 context,	 we	 will	 consider	 the	 informality	 of	 rules	 and	
procedures	and	how	they	evolved	over	time.	The	general	importance	of	rules	and	procedures,	both	formal	
and	 informal,	has	been	discussed	 in	detail	 in	the	extant	 literature,	notably	by	Yamin	and	Depledge	(2004),	
Depledge	 (2005)	 and	Monheim	 (2015).	 The	 following	 discussion	will	 build	 on	 this	 literature	 adding	 some	
insights	from	the	successful	negotiation	of	the	Paris	Agreement	in	December	2015.	The	discussion	will	again	
be	structured	by	first	describing	the	change	observed	over	time,	 then	explaining	these	developments,	and	
finally,	discussing	their	effect.	
	
3.1.	The	development	of	informal	rules	and	procedures	over	time	
Ever	since	the	beginning	of	the	international	climate	negotiations	informality	has	played	an	important	role.	
In	her	comprehensive	monograph	on	the	management	of	international	climate	negotiations	Depledge	(2005:	
85ff.)	provides	numerous	examples	on	pragmatic	interpretations,	bypassing	and	even	some	cases	of	explicit	
relaxation	 of	 formal	 rules	 and	 regulations	 (see	 also	 Yamin	 and	 Depledge	 2004).	 She	 also	 distinguishes	
between	a	number	of	arenas	of	different	degree	of	 informality	that	provide	opportunities	for	delegates	to	
discuss	 more	 freely	 (Depledge	 2005:	 108ff.).	 Their	 range	 covers	 everything	 between	 informal	 plenary	
meetings	 that	 only	 differ	 from	 formal	 plenaries	 by	 a	 corresponding	 declaration	 by	 the	 President	 of	 the	
conference,	 to	 informal	 consultations	 between	 the	 President	 and	 selected	 countries	 or	 broader	 but	 still	
highly	informal	working	groups	on	specific	technical	issues.	Due	to	their	strong	degree	of	informality,	some	
of	 the	 smaller	 technical	 working	 groups	 have	 later	 even	 been	 coined	 as	 “informal	 informals”	 (Monheim	
2015:	31).	In	the	climate	regime	as	elsewhere,	and	ever	since	its	start,	informal	negotiations—at	times	very	
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informally	“in	the	corridors	and	hotel	bars	of	conference	venues”	(Bauer	2006,	p.	34)—have	been	considered	
as	crucial	to	eventually	achieve	any	progress.		
Yet	already	for	the	early	2000s,	Depledge	(2005:	86)	notes	that	informality	appears	to	be	on	the	rise	to	an	
extent	 that	 some	 participants	 consider	 the	 formal	 plenaries	 and	 subsidiary	 bodies	 to	 have	 become	 of	 a	
“more	ritualistic”	nature.	She	further	notes	that	the	rising	number	of	specialized	topics	to	be	negotiated	also	
increases	the	number	of	informal	meetings.	The	latter	trend	has	probably	continued	over	the	last	decade.	In	
addition,	the	greater	differentiation	of	negotiation	groups	discussed	above	suggests	that	a	greater	number	
of	informal	bilateral	negotiations	between	members	of	these	groups	will	now	have	to	take	place	before	any	
agreement.	Indeed	in	the	run	up	to	the	Paris	Agreement	in	2015,	there	were	so	many	bilateral	consultations	
that	nobody	was	able	 to	keep	 track	 (Bodansky	2016),	 indeed	 the	French	Presidency	virtually	had	bilateral	
last-minute	talks	with	all	individual	groups	(Brun	2016:	120).	This	is	what	Depledge	(2005:	131)	refers	to	as	
“shuttle	diplomacy”.	
At	 the	 same	 time—in	 contrast	 to	 the	 development	 of	 informal	 organizations	 and	 initiatives	 discussed	 in	
Section	2—the	development	of	informality	within	the	UNFCCC	negotiations	has	certainly	not	simply	been	an	
uninterrupted	increase,	but	an	up	and	down	depending	on	the	issue	areas	to	be	discussed,	and	also	on	the	
willingness	of	the	parties	to	accept	complementary	negotiations	behind	the	scene.	Informal	meetings	have	
at	 times	 been	 heavily	 contested	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 inclusiveness	 and	 transparency	 resulting	 thereof.	 At	
Copenhagen	both	the	hand-picked	“Friends	of	 the	Chair”	and	the	small	 informal	meeting	between	Obama	
and	the	heads	of	state	of	the	BASIC	countries	that	came	up	with	the	draft	of	the	document	later	“taken	note	
of”	as	the	“Copenhagen	Accord”	were	heavily	criticized	in	this	respect.	This	led	to	considerable	mistrust	and	
contributed	to	the	failure	of	the	conference	(Monheim	2015:	37ff.,	see	also	Vihma	et	al.	2011:	325).	
Hence	rather	than	to	always	become	more	informal,	informal	procedures	have	at	times	been	replaced	again	
by	more	formal	approaches,	or	by	other,	more	innovative	informal	approaches.	
In	addition	to	informal	meetings	during	the	UNFCCC	conference	itself,	the	presidencies	usually	organize	an	
informal	 negotiation	 process	 throughout	 the	 preceding	 year	 meeting	 individual	 groups	 and	 member	
countries.	Their	intensity	and	structure	also	varied	over	time.		
When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 interpretation	 of	 rules,	 informality	 can	 become	 similarly	 controversial.	 A	matter	 in	
case	is	the	interpretation	of	the	consensus	principle	for	the	final	agreement.	The	consensus	principle	itself	is	
not	 formally	 anchored	 in	 the	 Convention,	 but	 results	 from	 the	 lack	 of	 agreement	 on	 specific	 voting	
provisions	 (Monheim	2015:	31).	Ever	since	the	agreement	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol	 in	1997,	 there	have	been	
instances	 where	 a	 consensus	 was	 declared	 despite	 disagreement	 by	 some	 of	 the	 parties.	 At	 Kyoto,	 the	
President	 read	 out	 the	 controversial	 paragraph	 and	 asked	whether	 there	were	 any	 objections.	 But	when	
India,	China	and	the	EU	raised	their	flags,	he	quickly	went	on	with	the	next	paragraph.	There	were	no	other	
objections.	Had	anyone	complained	at	this	point,	he	would	have	been	held	responsible	for	the	failure	of	the	
negotiations.	 So	 the	 agreement	 passed	 (Grubb	 et	 al.	 1999:	 96).	 In	 other	 instances,	 parties	 did	 formally	
complain.	In	Geneva	1996	and	in	Copenhagen	2009	this	led	to	the	parties’	decision	to	merely	“take	note	of”	
rather	 than	 to	 agree	 upon	 the	 final	 document.	 One	 year	 after	 Copenhagen	 at	 the	 Cancun	 conference,	
however,	 the	 agreement	 was	 gaveled	 through	 against	 the	 explicit	 objection	 by	 Bolivia4	 and	 the	 same	
																																								 																				
4	It	is	noteworthy	that	President	Espinosa	provided	a	peculiar	definition	of	“consensus”	as	follows:	"Consensus	requires	
that	everyone	is	given	the	right	to	be	heard	and	have	their	views	given	due	consideration	and	Bolivia	has	been	given	
this	opportunity.	Consensus	does	not	mean	that	one	country	has	the	right	of	veto,	and	can	prevent	193	others	 from	
	
	
12	
happened	 again	 one	 year	 later	 in	 Doha	 against	 the	 explicit	 objection	 by	 Russia,	 Ukraine	 and	 Belarus	
(Rajamani	2016:	212).	After	Cancun,	the	press	reported	that	Bolivia	might	consider	challenging	the	Cancun	
decision	at	 the	 International	Court	of	 Justice,	but	 this	would	have	had	 little	chance	of	 success	 (Werksman	
2010).	And	in	the	following	year,	despite	the	blunt	ignorance	of	the	objection	of	a	major	power	like	Russia,	
the	negotiation	process	continued	based	on	the	‘agreement’	at	Doha.	However,	to	retaliate,	Russia	blocked	
the	meetings	 of	 the	UNFCCC	 subsidiary	 bodies	 at	 the	 following	 Bonn	meeting	 in	 spring	 2012	 for	 a	whole	
week.	The	question	arises	how	far	the	consensus	interpretation	can	be	stretched	in	the	future	when	major	
parties	flag	their	objections.	In	Paris,	this	was	not	necessary	as	only	Nicaragua	voiced	some	objection,	but	did	
not	insist	on	the	matter.		
However,	 in	 Paris,	 the	 agreement	was	 at	 risk	 just	 before	 its	 conclusion,	 due	 to	 an	 error	 in	 the	 draft	 that	
stated	 “shall”	 instead	 of	 “should”	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 increasing	 ambition	 of	 emission	 reductions	 by	 the	
United	States.	 Legally,	 this	would	have	 turned	a	 recommendation	 into	an	obligation.	The	 issue	was	highly	
critical	 as	 the	 new	 formulation	would	 have	 implied	 that	 President	 Obama	 could	 not	 himself	 approve	 the	
agreement,	 but	 would	 have	 required	 congressional	 agreement,	 and	 in	 fact	 a	 two-thirds	 majority	 in	 the	
Senate	(Bodansky	2016,	Bodansky	and	Spiro	2016).	Conference	President	Laurent	Fabius	eventually	decided	
to	return	to	the	term	“should”	and	to	include	this	change	in	a	list	of	“small	technical	issues	and	translation	
errors”	that	remained	to	be	addressed.	The	list	was	very	quickly	read	out	in	the	plenary,	and	hardly	anyone	
could	verify	the	different	points	so	fast.	Nobody	objected.	
It	should	be	noted	that	the	whole	set-up	of	the	Agreement	had	already	been	oriented	at	the	idea	to	make	it	
look	like	an	ordinary	conference	decision,	rather	than	a	binding	international	agreement.	Hence	the	relevant	
text	of	the	Agreement	is	hidden	in	the	annex	of	the—otherwise	brief—decision	document.	
	
3.2.	Explaining	changes	in	informality	of	rules	and	procedures	
It	appears	that	the	informal	interpretation	and	at	times	circumvention	of	formal	rules	and	processes	can	be	
helpful	to	forge	a	final	decision	and	compromise,	but	at	the	same	time,	it	can	be	over-stretched,	hurt	certain	
parties,	destroy	trust	and	 lead	to	an	unnecessary	stalemate.	This	seems	to	have	happened	 in	Copenhagen	
and	 the	 Presidencies	 of	 subsequent	 conferences	 had	 to	 make	 a	 substantial	 effort	 to	 restore	 some	 trust	
among	 parties.	 During	 all	 these	 conferences	 from	 Cancun	 in	 2010	 to	 Paris	 in	 2015,	 the	 constant	mantra	
iterated	by	the	Presidency	was	transparency	and	 inclusiveness.	Monheim	(2015)	compares	Copenhagen	to	
Cancun	based	on	numerous	interviews	and	finds	that	delegates	broadly	agree	that	Copenhagen	completely	
failed	in	this	respect,	while	Cancun	worked	out	very	well.	For	instance,	instead	of	organizing	the	traditional	
“Friends	of	the	Chair”	meetings	with	participants	selected	by	the	President,	regions	themselves	nominated	
their	participants.	While	this	was	more	inclusive	and	transparent,	it	turned	out	to	be	a	suboptimal	frame	for	
efficient	exchange	because	the	number	of	participants	was	often	too	high,	going	up	to	70	persons	(Monheim	
2015:	54).	As	a	consequence,	South	Africa	pioneered	the	“Indaba”	(=”business”	in	Zulu)	approach	in	Durban	
2011.	 In	 principle	 every	 country	 could	 still	 send	 a	 minister,	 but	 the	 overall	 number	 of	 participants	 was	
constraint	 to	 about	 40	 people	who	 could	 be	 seated	 around	 a	 square	 table.	 Ever	 since,	 this	 approach	 has	
been	 applied	 as	 governments	 have	 been	 able	 to	 informally	 agree	which	ministers	 should	 take	 the	 scarce	
seats	at	the	table.	Especially	if	accompanied	by	a	wise	information	policy	by	the	president	where	results	of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 			
moving	forward	after	years	of	negotiations	on	something	that	our	societies	and	future	generations	expect."	(IISD	2010:	
28).	
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the	 Indaba	 are	 communicated	 to	 the	 formal	 plenary	 every	 day,	 the	 approach	 was	 seen	 as	 sufficiently	
inclusive	to	allow	an	efficient	negotiation.	Laurent	Fabius	very	skillfully	applied	this	approach	during	the	Paris	
Conference	to	achieve	a	constructive	mix	of	informality	and	transparency	(South	Africa	2015).	
When	observing	 the	 increase	and	 then	 fall	 in	 informality,	 one	 could	 think	of	 a	 formality-informality	 cycle.	
The	cycle	is	based	on	an	experimental	testing	of	the	extent	to	which	rules	and	procedures	can	be	rendered	
more	flexible	and	hence	efficient,	but	with	the	risk	of	sudden	fallback	and	heavy	criticism.	Finding	acceptable	
and	 efficient	 procedural	 innovation	 is	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 a	 matter	 of	 the	 creativity	 and	 sensitivity	 of	 the	
presidency.		
Formality-informality	cycles	also	occur	without	any	crisis	or	criticism,	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 introduction	of	
new	 issues	 to	 be	 explored.	 An	 instructive	 example	 is	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	market	mechanisms	 of	 the	
Kyoto	Protocol,	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	and	Joint	Implementation	(JI).	They	emerged	as	a	
real	 surprise	 during	 the	 Kyoto	 Conference	 of	 1997	 (Grubb	 et	 al.	 1999:	 97ff.),	 but	 a	 long	 discussion	 had	
preceded	 this	 decision.	 After	 the	Berlin	 Conference	of	 1995	had	 agreed	 to	 test	market-based	 approaches	
through	a	pilot	phase	of	“Activities	Implemented	Jointly”	(AIJ),	a	number	of	countries	and	private	actors	had	
started	 to	 experiment	with	mitigation	 projects.	While	 formally	 such	 projects	 could	 not	 generate	 emission	
credits,	the	undeclared	aim	of	the	pioneers	was	to	eventually	achieve	this,	and	they	did	so	in	Kyoto.	As	these	
instruments	were	 highly	 innovative,	 the	 subsequent	 setting	 of	 rules	was	 challenging	 and	 involved	 varying	
degrees	of	informality.	
The	World	Bank	especially	 felt	 that	 it	was	well	placed	to	play	a	key	role	 in	defining	 the	rules	of	 the	Kyoto	
Mechanisms.	 Therefore,	 in	 1999	 it	 set	 up	 the	 “Prototype	 Carbon	 Fund”	 (PCF)	 open	 for	 government	 and	
private	subscriptions	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2011:	263).	At	the	same	time,	private	sector	players	set	
up	 the	 International	 Emissions	 Trading	 Association	 (IETA)	 as	 a	 lobby	 group	 to	 influence	 design	 of	 the	
mechanisms.	The	formal	negotiations	on	the	rules	for	CDM	and	JI	were	only	dragging	on	slowly.		
The	Marrakech	 Conference	 in	 2001	 then	 formally	 agreed	 on	 a	 set	 of	 rules	 for	 CDM	 and	 JI	 as	well	 as	 the	
institutions	overseeing	these	mechanisms	(CDM	Executive	Board	and	JI	Supervisory	Committee).	However,	
their	 detailed	 interpretation,	 for	 example	 regarding	 the	 methodologies	 for	 defining	 project	 baselines,	
remained	 unclear.	 Building	 on	 the	 first	 lessons	 from	 the	 PCF,	 the	World	 Bank	 engaged	with	 a	 number	 of	
governments	to	set	up	specific	funds	for	CDM	and	JI	investments,	e.g.	with	the	Netherlands,	Spain	and	Italy	
(Michaelowa	 and	 Michaelowa	 2011:	 263).	 The	 World	 Bank	 was	 quite	 clear	 that	 it	 expected	 the	 specific	
baseline	and	monitoring	methodologies	to	be	those	that	it	had	developed	for	its	funds.	The	CDM	Executive	
Board	 did,	 however,	 not	 accept	 this	 reasoning	 and	 rejected	 several	 of	 the	 World	 Bank’s	 methodology	
proposals	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2016a).	
Only	 after	 2005	 when	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 had	 become	 operational,	 all	 major	 elements	 of	 the	 market	
mechanisms	had	been	formally	defined.	After	they	have	worked	well	for	a	while,	the	Paris	Agreement	now	
suggests	that	there	will	be	new	mechanisms.	Again	the	floor	 is	open	for	new	 ideas.	Hence	the	cycle	starts	
anew.		
A	key	informal	way	for	the	emergence	of	new	topics	is	their	discussion	through	side	events	at	the	UNFCCC	
negotiation	sessions.	Such	side	events	have	traditionally	been	organized	by	accredited	observer	NGOs	(see	
Hjerpe	and	Buhr	2014,	Schröder	and	Lovell	2012).	The	UNFCCC	Secretariat	administers	the	allocation	of	time	
slots	to	organizations	proposing	a	side	event.	Given	that	the	signaling	function	of	side	events	has	increasingly	
been	recognized,	since	the	mid-2000s	the	demand	for	slots	has	exceeded	supply.	Therefore,	the	Secretariat	
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has	 developed	 an	 increasingly	 elaborate	 set	 of	 principles	 for	 prioritizing	 side	 event	 applications.	 These	
incentivized	collaboration	between	governments	and	NGOs.	For	the	last	years,	a	significant	number	of	side	
events	 have	 been	 held	 regarding	 the	 design	 of	 new	 market	 mechanisms,	 and	 negotiation	 positions	 of	
governments	have	been	influenced	by	these	events.	
As	 the	 negotiations	 in	 the	 subsidiary	 bodies	 of	 the	 UNFCCC	 in	May	 2016	 revealed	 significant	 differences	
between	government	positions	on	the	market	mechanisms,	governments	were	asked	to	provide	submissions	
on	their	views	until	end	of	September	2016.	At	the	same	time,	initiatives	are	emerging	to	test	approaches	to	
the	mechanisms.	For	example,	the	World	Bank	is	setting	up	a	“Transformative	Carbon	Asset	Facility”	for	this	
purpose.	 This	 mirrors	 the	 approach	 undertaken	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	 the	 Kyoto	
Mechanisms	(see	Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2011).	
	
3.3.	The	effect	of	informal	rules	and	procedures	
The	 above	 discussion	 shows	 that	 the	 use	 of	 informal	 rules	 and	 procedures	 can	 have	 both	 positive	 and	
negative	effects,	depending	on	 the	right	balance	 in	 response	 to	participants’	willingness	 to	either	proceed	
fast	 or	 first	 remove	 remaining	 stumbling	 blocks,	 to	 the	 general	 atmosphere	 of	 trust	 or	 mistrust,	 to	 the	
specific	topic	at	stake	and	to	the	question	how	ripe	it	is	for	final	decision.	The	judgement	of	which	informal	
rules	 and	procedures	 are	 ‘good’	or	 ‘bad’	 cannot	be	made	 in	 general	 terms	 as	 it	 depends	on	 the	 concrete	
situation.	 Bodansky	 (2016)	 for	 instance	 argues	 that	 if	 countries	 had	 been	 as	 familiar	with	 the	 bottom-up	
system	of	nationally	determined	contributions	as	they	are	now,	the	conference	in	Copenhagen	might	already	
have	 led	 to	an	agreement.	The	 judgement	of	whether	a	 specific	approach	or	 interpretation	 is	appropriate	
and	 will	 be	 accepted	 by	 the	 parties	 lies	 in	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 Presidency.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	
diplomatic	skills	and	the	management	capacity	of	the	President	and	his	or	her	team	have	a	major	impact	on	
the	 overall	 outcomes	 of	 the	 negotiation	 process	 and	 hence	 for	 the	 effective	mitigation	 of	 global	 climate	
change.	
	
4.	Conclusion	
The	 number	 of	 informal	 organizations	 involved	 in	 international	 climate	 politics	 has	 significantly	 increased	
over	 time.	 They	 generally	 fulfil	 a	 contributing	 role	 to	 the	 UNFCCC	 process,	 like	 the	 country	 negotiation	
groups	and	groups	set	up	to	engage	in	operationalization	of	the	Kyoto	Mechanisms.	Only	in	times	when	the	
UNFCCC	process	had	stalled,	 some	of	 them	tried	 to	serve	as	alternative.	This	was	particularly	 the	case	 for	
organizations	set	up	in	the	context	of	the	Ban	Ki	Moon	Summit	of	2014.	But	once	the	UNFCCC	process	came	
back	 on	 track	 through	 the	 Paris	 Agreement,	 these	 institutions	 have	 acknowledged	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	
UNFCCC.	
Due	 to	 the	 need	 for	 consensus,	 the	 UNFCCC	 process	 has	 developed	 a	 number	 of	 informal	 processes	 to	
remain	 operational.	 Some	 of	 these	 processes	 have	 been	more	 successful	 than	 others—e.g.	 the	 “Indaba”	
approach	 pioneered	 by	 South	 Africa	 at	 the	 Durban	 conference,	 which	 served	 as	 a	 model	 for	 the	 French	
approach	in	Paris	2015.	The	Copenhagen	conference	of	2009	had	been	a	high	profile	case	of	failure	due	to	
informal	 procedures	 seen	 as	 exclusionary	by	 relevant	 parties.	Given	 the	 key	 role	of	 the	host	 country	of	 a	
COP,	 its	 choice	 of	 the	 appropriate	 informal	 procedure	 is	 critical	 for	 the	 COP’s	 success.	 Not	 only	 the	
procedure	itself	but	also	the	way	of	communicating	its	outcomes	is	important,	as	again	shown	by	the	Paris	
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conference.	The	most	striking	informal	approach	in	the	UNFCCC	context	is	the	interpretation	of	consensus,	
which	 was	 stretched	 considerably	 in	 2010	 and	 2012.	 Especially	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 where	 Russia	 was	
overridden,	the	limitations	of	this	approach	became	apparent.	
In	a	number	of	 cases,	 for	example	 in	 the	context	of	market	mechanisms,	a	 formality-informality	 cycle	has	
emerged	where	 a	 formal	 decision	 by	 the	 UNFCCC	 process	 triggers	 informal	 activities	 that	 in	 turn	 lead	 to	
formalization	in	the	form	of	rules.	Such	cycles	can	repeat	themselves	over	time.			
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Annex	1:	List	of	interviews	at	the	UNFCCC	negotiations	in	Paris,	10th	December,	2015	
	
         
             Organization 
 
Name and function of person interviewed 
 
International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) 
 
Patrick Andrew Wylie 
(Senior REDD+ Advisor / Climate Change Mitigation 
Policy Officer) 
 
European Patent Office (EPO) 
Dr. Ilja Rudyck 
(Senior Economist) 
 
International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) 
Alessia Valentini 
(Program Assistant) 
 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
Dr. Martin Frick 
(Director of Climate, Energy and Tenure Division) 
 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) 
 
Blandine Ferrier 
(Associate Environment Officer) 
 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
Stefan Micallef 
(Director, Marine Environment Division) 
 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Jessika Berns 
(Junior Technical Officer) 
 
 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Julia Heiss 
(Programme Specialist) 
 
 
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) 
Verania Chao Rebolledo 
(Officer of Energy and Environmental Programmes) 
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Annex	2:	Descriptive	statistics	
Table	A1:	Developing	country	participation	and	mitigation	orientation	of	TGI	design	
Share	of	non-Annex	I	
members	
Sum	of	design	criteria	met	
	
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 Total	
Zero	 14	 7	 6	 10	 1	 38	
	
(37%)	 (18%)	 (16%)	 (26%)	 (3%)	 (100%)	
Low	 13	 9	 4	 1	 0	 27	
	
(48%)	 (33%)	 (15%)	 (4%)	 (0%)	 (100%)	
medium	 13	 6	 2	 0	 0	 21	
	
(62%)	 (29%)	 (10%)	 (0%)	 (0%)	 (100%)	
High	 10	 5	 4	 3	 0	 22	
	
(45%)	 (23%)	 (18%)	 (14%)	 (0%)	 (100%)	
Only	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	
	
(100%)	 (0%)	 (0%)	 (0%)	 (0%)	 (100%)	
Total	 51	 27	 16	 14	 1	 109	
	
(47%)	 (25%)	 (15%)	 (13%)	 (1%)	 (100%)	
Notes:	Numbers	in	brackets	refer	to	row	percentages.	The	categories	for	the	share	(s)	of	non-Annex	I	membership	are:		
‘only’:	s=100%,	‘high’:	100%>s>50%,	‘medium’:	50%≥s>25%,	‘low’:	25%≥s>0%,	‘zero’:	s=0%.	The	association	between	the	two		
variables	is	insignificant	(Cramer’s	V	=	0.20,	p-value	=	0.40).	
Design	criteria	as	defined	in	Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	(2016)	include	the	existence	of	1)	a	mitigation	target,	2)	financial	incentives,		
3)	a	clearly	defined	baseline,	and	4)	some	mechanism	for	MRV.	
	
